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Abstract 
The present study investigates the influence of product market competition on the dividend policies of the listed 
companies at KSE 100 index in Pakistan. It identify whether product market competition mitigates agency 
problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In particular, we examine firm dividend 
policies in competitive market, the study use three statistical measures for the analysis of 30 textile firms. The 
result shows that the product market competition have no significant impact on dividend policies of Pakistan. 
This study recommends that the product market competition can be an effective tool that can force the managers 
to give cash to shareholders. 




Cash dividend is the most important gauge that the investors can use to evaluate the financial health of the 
company. Investors earn cash from their stock investment without having to sell them. Dividends are not only 
the source of generating income but they also signal an impression that investing in company will be profitable 
for them. Dividend policy of the firm is basically the decision of the management to pay out cash to shareholders 
either in shape of cash dividend or a share repurchase. Age of corporation, Extent of share distribution, Trends of 
profits, Need for additional capital,  changes in Government policies, Business cycle, Type of industry, Taxation 
policy, Future requirements and Cash balances are the important factors that decide the dividend policy. But 
Agency Problem is one of the most important determinants of corporate dividend policy. 
Agency problem arises when there is a conflict of interest between the management and the 
shareholders. It has been observed that dividend payment is a great solution to the agency problems. Minority 
shareholders and the investors receive the dividend which basically depends upon how the country’s regulations 
and company’s corporate governance force the manager to distribute cash. Bartram et al., (2012) explain that 
poor corporate governance and agency problem intensity force the company to pay the smaller cash dividends. It 
has also been proved that Minority shareholders have to face the cost of agency conflicts and the market forces 
which force the corporate insider to make dividends are in the best interest of the shareholders. 
Another important phenomenon is product market competition. Firms are competing with each other for 
the attainment of some common standard goals. We basically have the aim to check how the agency problems 
and perfect market competition affect the cash dividends. 
We study with the perspective of Pakistan and investigate is product market competition, an easily 
specialized market mechanism that can force the company to pay cash dividend.  In a country like Pakistan, 
where there is a political instability, poor laws and regulations regarding protecting the rights of shareholders of 
corporations, weak corporate governance, rigid agency conflicts, it becomes very important to test the impact of 
market competition on corporate dividend policy and define the ways to extract the dividend from the 
corporations (Allen and Gale, 1999). 
Grullon and Michaely (2007) suggested that extreme product market competition will compel the managers to 
give cash because it increases the overinvesting and risk for two reasons: 
i. Overinvesting in the projects having negative NPV, will make the firm less competitive and disturb the 
repute of the firm in the industry. 
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ii. High competition provides better opportunities to the investors to compare the performance of different 
firms competing in the market. 
Grullon and Michaely (2007) examined agency conflicts between Shareholders and Managers primarily, 
but it might be possible it has the same  influence and application on Controlling and Minority 
shareholders. 
We study the effect of product market competition on dividend policy in Pakistan. We select the study 
in the Pakistani market because it fails to protect the right of the shareholders and having severe intensity of 
agency conflicts. 
In Pakistan the major businesses are controlled by a family, which often assign an apex manager. 
Therefore, Pakistani managers mostly represent the interest of controlling shareholders. It has been observed that 
the managers and the controlling shareholders are involved in misappropriations of company accounts for their 
own interest. Therefore there should be such a mechanism of corporate governance that minimizes agency 
conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The same is the case with controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders for reducing the agency conflicts. At the end we anticipate finding that Pakistani firms 
have fewer agency conflicts in competitive markets and pay more cash dividends to minority shareholders. 
The most of the study in Pakistan is done basically on the determinants of dividends and effect of the 
dividend policy on shareholders wealth. The objective of the study is to investigate whether the product market 
competition an important factor that influence the cash dividend of the corporations. This research contributes in 
the area of the Finance. 
The study is further divided into different sections. Chapter two is of Literature Review. Chapter three 
includes Data and Research Methodology. Chapter four discusses Results and discussion and at the end chapter 




The literature on dividend policy is based on some basic theories. The first and most important theory which is 
presented by Miller and Modigliani (1961) relates to dividend irrelevance hypothesis. 
Dividend Irrelevance Theory 
The dividend irrelevance theory describes that any payment of cash dividend have little or no impact on share 
price. Modigliani and Miller approach is based upon basic assumptions of a perfect capital market and rational 
investors.  
 Bird in Hand Theory 
Gordon, Paradis, and Rorke (1972) present a theory in contrast with Modigliani and Miller, which assumes that 
investors are indifferent to whether their returns from holding a share arise from dividends or capital gains. 
Moreover they state that dividend payments are relevant for the valuation of the firms. 
 Tax Preference Theory 
The basic assumption of this theory is difference in tax treatment between capital gains and dividend taxes exist 
and affect the value of the firm and dividend policy. In real life there is often a differential in tax treatment 
between dividends and capital gains, because most of the time investors are interested in after-tax return. It has 
also been assumed that rate of tax on dividend is high as compare to the capital gains. 
 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving problems that can exist in agency relationships. Agency theory 
describes the basic problem in the organizations. Manager working on behalf of the shareholders focus on their 
personal goals rather than group goals. So, there is a conflict of interest between these two groups. 
 Dividend Signaling Theory 
This theory suggests that a dividend announcement by a company gives a positive signal about the company and 
its increased future earnings. It also creates a positive image of the company regarding stability growth and 
shareholders satisfaction. 
Empirical Review 
He (2012) examines whether product market competition mitigates agency conflicts between minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders in Japan.  In a huge sample of Japanese firms, he analyze that firms in 
industries where competition is very much extensive pay more dividends as compare to the less competitive 
industries. Moreover, the effect of firm-level agency problems on cash dividends is less affective in highly 
competitive industries. The results indicate that product market competition is a useful control Instrument at 
industry level that can force managers to pay cash dividend to shareholders. 
Grullon and Michaely (2007) analyzes whether product market competition influence managers’ policy 
to give cash dividends to shareholders. There is a positive relationship between the corporate payouts and 
industry competition. They suggest that firms in more concentrated industries have considerably lesser payout 
ratios than firms in less concentrated industries. They also find that there is a stronger impact of product market 
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competition on cash dividends for the firms having the high agency cost. They state that a strong legal system 
put a pressure on controlling shareholders to give out excess cash to minority shareholders. 
Obembe, Imafidon and  Adegboye (2014)  investigate  the influence of product market competition on 
cash dividends. They use the pooled ordinary least square regression model (OLS). The results show that market 
competition is positively correlated with dividend policy. The market competition has negative influence on the 
dividend payout of Nigerian firms. The profitability and firm size have positive and significant influence on the 
Dividend. 
Griffith (2001) investigates the relationship between product market competition, growth rate and 
productivity. SMP (single market program) is used as the instrument for the change in product market 
competition. He used the ordinary least square regression model find out the positive correlation between the two 
variables.  
Easterbrook (1984) describes the dividend payouts in Malaysian listed Banks. He observed the impact 
of prudential regulation and product market competition on the dividend policy in the banks over the period of 
(1995-2007). Ordered probity modeling technique and Target Adjusted Model are used to interrogate the study. 
The results showed significant difference in the payouts of Islamic Banks (non interest based) and banking 
products based on interest. 
Byun, Lee and Park (2014) study the relation between corporate governance, Product market 
competition and the corporate dividend policy. The corporate governance is inversely proportion to corporate 
dividends. This relation is strongly exists in concentrated markets and diminishes in competitive markets. 
Januszewsk, Koke and Winter ( 2002) examine  how the productivity growth of German firms is 
effected by product market competition and corporate governance. Using a panel of almost 500 firms over the 
years 1986 to 1994, they found that increased productivity is the result of higher competition. Moreover, they 
suggest that firms under control of a strong ultimate owner reach high productivity levels, but not when the 
ultimate owner is a financial institution.  
Bartram et al., (2012) examine that the corporate dividend policy is shaped by the roles of firm and firm 
level agency conflicts. They discover that in strongly protected countries, shareholders are able to use their legal 
rights to obtain cash from firms but their ability to do so can be significantly slowed down when at the firm level 
cost of agency conflicts are high. In underdeveloped countries, investors can seek protection in firm by reducing 
agency conflicts.  
Liu (2002) suggests that corporate dividend policies are affected by external corporate governance 
environment. He presents two different models. The outcome model predicts an increase in external corporate 
governance lead to an increase in cash dividends because monitoring shareholders are better able to force 
controlling shareholders to give cash. In contrast, the substitute model states that an increase in the external 
corporate governance minimizes the role of dividends in monitoring agency costs, leading to a decrease in 
dividends. 
Halim and Bino (2013) investigate the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and 
firm’s dividend policy which is measured by firm’s ownership structure. They used econometric models with 
different attributes.  They find a significant negative relationship between capital owned by block holders and 
firms cash dividends. 
Kumar (2006) examines the probable link between corporate governance, structure of ownership 
dividend payout policy. He states a positive relationship exist between earning trends and dividends 
Grullen and Michaely (2007) analyze the strong association between the corporate dividend payout 
policy and the product market competition. By using the sample of manufacturing firms   they suggest that the 
less competitive industries have lower payout ratio.  Industry concentration levels and corporate cash dividends 
are negatively correlated. They suggest that agency problems have strong influence on the managers to distribute 
cash to shareholders. 
Wang and Wang (2015) for the first time investigate the impact of three types of state ownership on 
firms’ dividend pay-out. This study analyzes different payout behaviors of owners of different states. They found 
if the state enterprises are governed by local government and frontline staff officials, pay dividend more as 
compare to states governed by private owners.  
Allen and Gale (1999) argue that different countries have different nature of corporate governance 
systems. In the United States and United Kingdom it has been observed that managers have the threat of 
takeover and they work in the best interest of the shareholders. In Germany, Japan and France the banks and the 
other institutions are performing the role of monitors. There are evidence neither system is effective. 
Review/Studies in context of Pakistan 
Afza and Mirza (2010) investigate the major definite features of the firms that significantly impact on cash 
dividend behavior in emerging economy of Pakistan. The data is obtained from Karachi Stock Exchange. Cash 
dividend has the positive relationship with profitability and operating cash flows, whereas has negative 
relationship with managerial and individual ownership, size cash flow sensitivity and leverage. 
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Yuan and Zafar ( 2010) examine the impact of earnings management on cash dividend  both for Pakistani and 
Chinese firms. The results show for both the countries that earnings management has no impact on dividend 
payout policy. 
Imran (2011) examines the factors that determine the cash dividends by using the data of thirty six firms 
listed on Karachi Stock Exchange from engineering sector. He found that the size of the firm, cash flow, sales 
growth, profitability, dividend per share and the earnings per share are the most significant factors that determine 
dividend policy in the engineering sector of Pakistan. 
 Literature Gap 
In Pakistan most of the research is focused on the determinants of dividends and effect of dividend earnings on 
shareholders wealth. But currently in Pakistan the effect of product market competition on dividend payouts is 
not yet researched. This study is helpful for the investors for their investment in profitable ventures. Because the 
product market competition is very influential factor that significantly affect corporate dividend payouts. 
 
Data and Research Methodology 
The study is conducted on the Textile Sector of Pakistan. This chapter includes data and methodology, variables 
description, development of hypotheses, and the statistical description of the variables under study. 
The data from 2010-2014 is used in the study. The data consists of annual financial reports of 30 textile firms of 
Pakistan listed at Karachi Stock Exchange. 
Variables Description 
The variables used in this study are generally measures by following the past studies. Three types of variables 
are used, discussed below: 
   
Category Variable Name Description 
   
Dependent Variable  Cash Dividend Div/LTS, Div/LTA, Div/E 
   
Independent Variable Product market competition    Sales Growth 
   
Control variable Return On Asset Net profit / Total Asset 
   
Note: Cash dividend is the amount that is paid to the shareholders of the company against their investment in the 
company. Three measures of dividend payouts are used: (i) Dividend scaled by Net income (DIV/E), (ii) 
Dividend scaled by Lagged Total Sales (DIV/LTS) (iii) Dividend scaled by Lagged Total Assets (DIV/LTA). 
Product Market Competition is a situation where the firms producing similar products are competing with each 
other for some desired common goals. 
 
Development of Hypothesis 
Ho=Product Market Competition has no significant impact on firms cash dividends. 
H1= Product Market Competition has significant impact on firms cash dividends. 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
This part of the study includes Descriptive statistics outcomes, Pearson correlation analyses and the Regression 
analyses. 
Descriptive analysis 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics results on annual basis (2010-2014). 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DIV/LTS 150 -0.000004 0.002682 0.000029 0.000268 
DIV/LTA 150 -0.000006 0.000025 0.000001 0.000004 
DIV/E 150 -0.000498 0.000549 0.000015 0.000097 
GROWTH 150 -0.743562 839.430214 8.568394 83.929855 
ROA 150 -0.289244 19.002644 0.372666 2.357101 
Table 4.1 illustrates a summary of all the variables engaged in the model. During the five year period the mean 
value of Growth which is independent variable is maximum i.e 8.568394. On the other hand if we look at 
dependent variables, Div/LTS has the mean value of 0.000029. Div/LTA is another dependent variable and mean 
value of it is 0.000001. Div/Net income is also a dependent variable and mean value of it is 0.000015. The mean 
value for return on assets is 0.372666. Return on asset is being defined as the proportion of net income to total 
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asset. As for standard deviation concern it ranges from 0.000004 to 83.929855. 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 4.2 displays the Pearson correlation analysis of all the variables over five years period ranging from 2010 
to 2014. The dependent variable Dividend lagged to total sales is positively correlated with Dividend lagged to 
Total Asset. The table shows that Div/LTS has positive but not significant relation with Div/E.  
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
DIV/LTS DIV/LTA DIV/E GROWTH ROA 
DIV/LTS  1 
DIV/LTA  0.086438  1 
DIV/E 0.084522 0.376664**  1 
GROWTH  -0.011119 -0.025081 -0.015352 1 
ROA -0.015226 -0.017560  -0.018667  -0.028255 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
This Dependent variable is negatively correlated with Growth and Return on Asset. Div/LTA is also a dependent 
variable and is positively correlated with Div/E at 1% level of significance. Moreover the dependent variable 
Div/LTA is negatively correlated with Growth and control variable Return on asset. The dependent variable 
Div/E is negatively correlated with Growth and ROA at -0.015352 and -0.018667 respectively. The growth 
independent variable which is the proxy of perfect market competition is negatively correlated with ROA. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Table 3: Regression Analysis 
VARIABLES 
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C 
DIV/LTS DIV/LTA DIV/E 
Coefficient t-stat p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT 0.000030 1.095902 0.275835 0.000001*** 2.513611 0.013597 0.000015 1.506396 0.135215 
GROWTH -0.011558 -0.113813 0.909621 -0.025597 -0.252125 0.801478 -0.015892 -0.156504 0.875961 
ROA -0.015552 -0.153141 0.878605 -0.018284 -0.180088 0.857459 -0.019116 -0.188253 0.851071 
              
R2 0.000365   0.000963   0.000601   
Adjusted R2 -0.020246     -0.019636     -0.020005     
Note: *Significant at 0.10; **Significant at 0.05; ***Significant at 0.01 
Table 4.3 presents three panels for the regressed value of dividends. Panel A explains the regressed value for 
Div/LTS. The data reveals that there is a relation between Div/LTS and Growth (coef.=-0.011558 at t= -
0.113813and p=0.909621) for all the selected companies. Similarly Div/LTS has negative impact on return on 
assets (coef.=-0.015552 at t=-0.153141and p=0.878605). The value of R square is 0.000365 and adjusted R 
square is -0.020246. The above results show that lagged to total sales has no significant impact on Growth and 
ROA. Panel B and C explains the regressed value of Div/ LTA. The result shows the there is no relation between 
the variables under study. The value of R square and adjusted R square is 0.000963 and -0.019636 respectively. 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
In this study we investigate whether product market competition can play an important role in minimizing 
agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Pakistan. We select the country 
Pakistan because here the legal system is very weak for investor’s rights. We suppose that product market 
competition mitigates agency conflicts and force the manager to give cash. But in Pakistan mostly the businesses 
are family owned and top managers are sometimes hold more than 50% of the company holdings. More over the 
assumptions of Perfect Market Competition are very difficult to implement in a country like Pakistan. Our results 
show that the product market competition has no impact on companies’ dividend policies. The sample size in the 
study is very small and limited. There is a need to include more other variables to measure product market 
competition. There is also a need to apply this study in other market of the world. 
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